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ABSTRACT A coalitional game is proposed for multicell multi-user downlink beamforming. Each base
station intends tominimize its transmission power while aiming to attain a set of target signal-to-interference-
plus-noise-ratio (SINR) for its users. To reduce power consumption, base stations have incentive to cooperate
with other base stations to mitigate intercell interference. The coalitional game is introduced where base
stations are allowed to forge partial cooperation rather than full cooperation. The partition form coalitional
game is formulated with the consideration that beamformer design of a coalition depends on the coalition
structure outside the considered coalition. We first formulate the beamformer design for a given coalition
structure in which base stations in a coalition greedily minimize the total weighted transmit power without
considering interference leakage to users in other coalitions. This can be considered as a non-cooperative
game with each player as a distinct coalition. By introducing cost for cooperation, the coalition formation
game is considered for the power minimization-based beamforming. A merge-regret-based sequential
coalition formation algorithm has been developed that is capable of reaching a unique stable coalition
structure. Finally, an α-Modification algorithm has been proposed to improve the performance of the
coalition formation algorithm.
INDEX TERMS Downlink beamforming, power minimization, Nash equilibrium, coalitional game.
I. INTRODUCTION
The ever increasing demand for wireless services and appli-
cations has made the radio spectrum a scarce resource. The
efficiency of frequency use is becoming a key issue in design-
ing wireless networks. In traditional cellular networks, the
spectrum utilization is improved by employing single cell
based frequency reuse techniques. The limitation of such
arrangement is that a specific base station (BS) will treat sig-
nals from all other BSs as noise, which could severely degrade
the system performance. A possible way to mitigate inter-
cell interference is to jointly manage transmitters of all BSs
and perform multiple antenna beamforming. For example,
in [1], [2], and [3], signal level coordination has been consid-
ered in which each BS is equipped with a single antenna but
coordinates with all other BSs to form a virtual large antenna
array. A coordinated multicell downlink beamforming was
considered in [4] where all BSs cooperate with each other
only at the beamforming level. Though such coordination
can effectively achieve the aim of interference mitigation,
in a coordinated multicell network, messages have to be
exchanged between BSs through backhaul channels which
will cause considerable cost and burden to the network.
A. MULTICELL DOWNLINK BEAMFORMING
Coordinated downlink beamforming is an efficient method
to suppress inter-cell interference and to improve overall
performance of the network. Several downlink beamform-
ing techniques for multicell networks have been proposed
in recent years with different performance requirements.
In [4], beamformers for all users in all cells were coordinately
designed through minimizing the weighted total transmission
power of all BSs while a set of target SINRs is satisfied. This
method can be traced back to [5] in which a beamformer-
power based iterative algorithm was proposed that allowed
users to achieve a set of target SINRs. In [5], the uplink-
downlink duality has been applied as the key technique that
transforms the downlink beamforming problem to determine
the optimal virtual uplink beamformers which is easier to
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solve [6], while in [4], the Lagrangian duality was intro-
duced to transform the original problem to an uplink problem
where optimal uplink beamformers were designed using a
distributed approach.
Another commonly applied beamforming technique is to
fairly balance the SINRs of all users to the same level by
maximizing the worst case SINR under a maximum transmis-
sion power constraint, which is named as SINR balancing.
This problem has been studied in [7] for a single cell case,
in which SINRs of all users are maximized and balanced
to the same level. In [8], [9], and [10], the multicell SINR
balancing problem has been considered, where SINRs of all
users in all cells are balanced and maximized to the same
level. To further improve the performance, multicell beam-
forming algorithms based on per BS SINR balancing criterion
have been proposed in [11] and [12]. In these works, SINRs
of users in different cells were maximized and balanced to
different levels.
Though the coordination at the beamforming level can
effectively reduce the exchange of information between BSs
as compared to the signal level coordination, perfect chan-
nel reciprocal and strict synchronization are required. For
example, in [4], the dual uplink powers need to be iter-
atively updated based on stable synchronization schemes.
To avoid the disadvantages arising from full coordination,
game theoretic beamforming techniques have been proposed
in recent years. Different from the coordinated beamform-
ing, in a noncooperative game, each BS is considered as a
player that greedily maximizes its own utility. In [13], a game
theoretic method for multiple-input-single-output (MISO)
interference channel (IFC) was considered, in which each
BS equipped with multiple antennas served only one user
equipped with a single antenna. A two BSs based MISO
IFC beamforming has been studied in [14] for both the
competitive and the cooperative scenarios. In [14], it has
been found that the Nash equilibrium point of the MISO
IFC game is equivalent to the solution obtained through the
maximum ratio transmission (MRT). The competition in a
multicell multiuser network was studied using game theory
in [15] where each BS employs downlink beamforming to
greedily minimize its own transmission power. A sufficient
and necessary condition for the existence and uniqueness
of the Nash equilibrium has been discussed and similar to
[14], the Nash equilibrium is not Pareto optimal and always
inefficient. To improve the efficiency of theNash equilibrium,
pricing strategies have been applied in [15] and [16]. It has
been proved that the pricing scheme can effectively improve
the efficiency of the Nash equilibrium by compromising the
independence of each BS to some extent.
The inefficiency of the Nash equilibrium obtained in game
theoretic based multicell beamforming urges BSs to coordi-
nate with other BSs. However, if certain requirements for the
coordinated beamforming such as the availability of channel
state information and strict synchronization are included as
extra cost, not all BSs are guaranteed to benefit from full
coordination. For this reason, the mechanism for cooperation
should allow each BS to selectively cooperate with a subset
of BSs to maximize its own utility. The cooperative game that
was applied to the MISO IFC channels considered strategic
bargaining [17]. In [18], a MISO IFC beamforming based
coalition formationwas studied. Coalition structures obtained
through the algorithm proposed in [18] have been proved
always in a coalition structure stable set. However, in both
[17] and [18], only the scenario that each BS serves only one
user has been considered.
B. COALITIONAL GAME THEORY
Coalitional game aims to balance the competitiveness and
coordination by allowing players to partially cooperate with
each other. A coalition is defined as a group of players
jointly improving their benefits through cooperation within
the group [19]. The most widely studied coalitional game
is the game in characteristic form. In this form, the utility
of a coalition depends only on the members of the coali-
tion rather than any players outside the coalition [20]. Both
characteristic form coalitional games with transferable utility
(TU) and nontransferable utility (NTU) have been studied
in [21] and [22], respectively. Based on the coalitional game
in characteristic form, the canonical coalitional game has
been considered in which players are assumed to always
benefit from the formation of a larger coalition. Hence, the
grand coalition (the coalition of all players) is the optimal
structure. The aim of the canonical coalitional game is to
find the optimal solution that can maintain the stability of the
grand coalition [20]. The solution of a canonical coalitional
game has been investigated in [23]–[26] and [27].
Another class of coalitional games is the coalitional game
in partition form which was first introduced in [28]. Differ-
ent from the games in characteristic form, utility of players
in a coalition in partition form is highly dependent on the
structure outside of the coalition. The aim of a partition
form coalitional game is to study how a coalition structure
is formed and whether such coalition structure is stable.
For this purpose, several coalition formation mechanisms
namely dynamic coalition formation have been proposed.
A dynamic coalition formation game is studied in [29] in
which a player is allowed to merge with existing coalitions
at each stage. In [30], a split-merge based coalition formation
mechanism has been considered. A sequential based coali-
tion formation process where a coalition structure can be
achieved through sequentially merging or splitting has been
investigated in [31]. The stability of the coalition structures
has been discussed in a variety of works. In [32], the stable
coalition structures achieved through the equilibrium binding
agreement method for both the positive and the negative
externalities have been studied and compared. The work
in [30] provides the concepts of both strong andweak stability
as Dc-stable and Dhp-stable for the proposed split-merge
coalition formation game with transferable utility. Instead of
finding a stable structure, the stable coalition structure set has
been considered in [31] as a collection of all possible stable
coalitions. Other concepts such as the recursive core have also
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been studied as the solution of partition form coalition game
in [33].
C. CONTRIBUTION
We consider a coalitional game based multicell multiuser
downlink beamforming. The aim for each BS is to minimize
its transmission power while satisfying a set of target SINRs
for its users. In [4], this problem has been solved by coordi-
nately designing beamformers over all BSs in the network.
The work in [4] did not consider the cost arising from the
cooperation and every BS had the incentive to cooperate with
all other BSs to reduce its transmission power. However, in
practice, BSs might not benefit from such full cooperation
since the transmission power reduction for each BS through
the coordination may not be worthy as compared to the cost
incurred for forging cooperation. In this paper, we assume
there is a cost for cooperation, which is linearly proportional
to the number of BSs involved in the cooperation. Instead
of cooperating with all BSs, a set of BSs are allowed to
locally cooperate with each other by forming a coalition to
maximize their benefits. We consider the coalitional game
in partition form due to the fact that the transmission power
of a BS depends not only on the coalition that it is attached
to, but also on the structure of external coalitions. In [18],
a merge-based coalition formation algorithm was proposed
for the multicell MISO IFC problem. Based on the algorithm
proposed in [18], a merge-regret based coalition formation
algorithm is developed where BSs are allowed to split from
the newly formed coalition if they do not benefit from the
formation of the coalition. Instead of considering all poten-
tial combinations at each formation stage as stated in [18],
in the proposed algorithm, by numbering all coalitions at
each stage with a given numbering strategy, only a limited
number of combinations is required. This is because once a
combination is found to be valid, the corresponding coalition
will be formed and the rest of the potential combinations
will not be considered further. Hence, compared to [18], the
proposed algorithm can reduce the computational complexity
and coalition formation time. In addition, we investigated two
coalition formation decision rules with strong independence
and weak independence. To improve the performance of the
proposed coalition formation algorithm, an α-Modification
algorithm has been developed for different decision rules.
Finally, it is proved that by applying the proposed coalition
formation algorithm, a unique and stable output coalition
structure is obtained.
D. ORGANIZATION
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.
In section II, the system model and problem formulation are
given. Section III discusses the coalitional multicell beam-
forming with different coalition structures. In section IV,
we formulate the coalition formation algorithm for the pro-
posed multicell downlink beamforming game. The simula-
tion results are provided in section V followed by conclusions
in section VI.
Notations: Superscripts (·)T and (·)H represent the trans-
pose and Hermitian transpose respectively;R andC stand for
the real and complex spaces; I denotes the identity matrix;
E{·} denotes the expectation operation; A ≥ 0 means each
element of matrix A is nonnegative; A > 0means that A ≥ 0
and at least one element of matrix A is positive.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND PROBLEM FORMULATION
A. SYSTEM MODEL
A multicell multi-user wireless network consisting of J cells
is considered. Let  = {1, · · · , J} be the set of all cells. It is
assumed there are K users in each cell. A MISO technique is
employed, i.e. each BS is equipped with M antennas, while
each user terminal has a single antenna. hi,j,k ∈ CM×1
represents the channel vector from the ith BS to the kth user
in the jth cell while sj,k denotes the information symbol to
the kth user in the jth cell, where E{|sj,k |2} = 1. To perform
downlink beamforming, we denote uj,k ∈ CM×1 as the
downlink transmit beamformer vector for the kth user in the
jth cell. Then, the received signal at the kth user in the jth cell
can be written as
yj,k =
K∑
l=1
hHj,j,kuj,lsj,l +
J∑
i=1
i 6=j
K∑
m=1
hHi,j,kui,msi,m + zj,k (1)
where zj,k in (1) is assumed to be complex additive white
Gaussian noise with zero mean and variance σ 2j,k . The SINR
of the kth user in the jth cell is given by
0DLj,k =
|uHj,khj,j,k |2
K∑
l 6=k
|uHj,lhj,j,k |2 +
J∑
i 6=j
K∑
m=1
|uHi,mhi,j,k |2 + σ 2j,k
. (2)
B. MOTIVATION OF COALITIONAL GAME
We consider a problem where each BS optimizes its beam-
formers and transmission power subject to achieving a target
SINR for its users. In traditional single cell based processing,
the problem is solved by letting each BS to individually
design beamformers for its own users and greedily minimize
its own transmission power. The advantage of this method
is that BSs do not need to communicate with each other;
however, since BSs are competing with each other, the trans-
mit power for each BS is always considerably high. Another
way of solving the transmit power minimization problem is
to coordinately design beamformers for all users in all cells,
which can effectively mitigate the inter-cell interference to all
users [4]. However, in [4], the cost arising from cooperation
has not been taken into consideration; hence, BSs always
have incentive to cooperate with each other to improve their
performacne. In practice, there is a cost for cooperation which
may discourage certain BSs to cooperate with other BSs.
Hence, in this work, by introducing cooperation cost, we
consider a scenario that certain sets of BSs are allowed to
form coalitions locally to maximize their overall gain. For a
given coalition structure, the power minimization is used to
VOLUME 5, 2017 9253
Y. Wu et al.: Coalitional Games for Downlink Multicell Beamforming
determine the optimal beamformers, while by employing the
coalition formation algorithm, an optimal coalition structure
is obtained.
III. COALITIONAL BEAMFORMING PROBLEM
We begin by focusing on downlink transmit beamforming in
the multicell multiuser scenario. The transmit beamformers
of users in the jth cell are denoted in a matrix form as U j =
[uj,1, · · · ,uj,K ], where U j ∈ Bj and Bj is the strategy space
of BS j, defined as
Bj := {U j ∈ CM×K } (3)
Then, the strategy profile of all BSs is the joint set of all
possible strategies, defined as
(U1, · · · ,UJ ) ∈ X := B1 × · · · × BJ (4)
For each BS, the aim is to minimize the transmission power
while ensuring that the downlink SINRs of its users are
greater than a set of target values, i.e, 0DLj,k ≥ γj,k . Hence, the
utility function of the jth BS is defined as the transmission
power at BS j,
pj =
K∑
k=1
‖uj,k‖22 = ‖U j‖2F , ∀j ∈ . (5)
For a given set of players , a coalition structure S =
{C1, · · · ,CNs} is defined as a partition of  with the fol-
lowing characteristics:
⋃Ns
q=1 Cq =  and Cx ∩ Cy = ∅ for
any Cx ,Cy ∈ S. Based on the above definitions, the game in
partition form can be expressed as [18]
〈, X , F , (pj)j∈〉, (6)
where F is the partition function that assigns all possible
partitions to the game. It is assumed that the utility of a player
in a coalition cannot be transferred to other players in the
same coalition, and this is known as nontransferable utility.
In the following, the coalitional beamforming problem with
various coalition structures is discussed.
A. NON-COOPERATIVE MULTICELL BEAMFORMING
In coalitional game theory, a special coalition structure
is that all coalitions are singletons. In this case, each
player is competing with all other players, which falls into
the traditional strategic non-cooperative game (SNG). For the
transmission power minimization problem, players are the
BSs. Each BS will greedily minimize its own transmission
power without constraining interference to users in other
cells. The transmission power is the utility function of each
BS. Hence, for the non-cooperative game, the beamforming
strategy set of the jth BS is defined as
B′j := {U j ∈ CM×K : 0DLj,k (U j,U−j) ≥ γj,k ,∀k} (7)
where U−j is the strategy of all BSs except BS j. Then, the
coalitional beamforming game with non-cooperative coali-
tion structure can be expressed as
〈, {B′j}j∈, (pj)j∈〉 (8)
This game has been considered in [15] and [34], for which
the best response strategy of the jth BS is the solution of the
following optimization problem:
minimize
U j
‖U j‖2F (9a)
subject to
|uHj,khj,j,k |2
K∑
l 6=k
|uHj,lhj,j,k |2 + ηj,k
≥ γj,k , ∀k (9b)
where ηj,k = ∑Ji 6=j∑Km=1 |uHi,mhi,j,k |2 + σ 2j,k is the noise
power plus the inter-cell interference from all of the users in
all other BSs except BS j. It has been proven in [15] that if
both the necessary and the sufficient conditions are satisfied,
a unique Nash equilibrium point exists for the game and a set
of best beamforming strategies {U∗1, · · · ,U∗J } can be found
as satisfying
pj(U∗j ) ≤ pj(U j), ∀U j ∈ B
′
j, ∀j ∈ , (10)
where pj(U∗j ) is the transmission power of the jth BS at the
equilibrium. It has also been found in [15] that for each BS,
beam patterns of its users are independent of the value of
the inter-cell interference. This means that for a given set
of target SINRs, each BS can design a set of fixed beam
patterns for its users regardless of the interference value ηj,k .
Therefore, the strategies of the non-cooperative beamform-
ing game can be reduced to a set of power allocation as
follows:
B′j(p) := {pj ∈ RK+ : 0DLj,k (pj, p−j) ≥ γj,k ,∀k} (11)
where pj and p−j are power allocation of the jth BS and
all other BSs except the jth BS respectively. By substituting
the obtained beam patterns into (9b) and setting equality
in (9b), the best response strategy of the jth BS can be
obtained as
p∗j = G−1j ηj (12)
where ηj = [ηj,1, · · · , ηj,K ]T . Gj is a matrix obtained from
hj,j,k and beam patterns U¯j of all users in the jth cell as defined
in Claim (4) of [15]. Hence, once the intersection point of
(12) is obtained, the Nash equilibrium is achieved. It has been
discussed in [15] that the Nash equilibrium exists if and only
if the following matrix is anM-matrix:
G =

G1 −G21 . . . −GJ1
−G12 G2 . . . −GJ2
...
...
. . .
...
−G1J −G2J . . . GJ
 (13)
where Gij is the inter-cell interference matrix from ith cell to
the jth cell. By summarizing all of the above arguments, the
best response strategies and utilities at the Nash equilibrium
can be determined through algorithm I.
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Algorithm 1 Beamforming With Non-Cooperative Game
1) Determine the downlink beamformer uj,k for all users
using the method proposed in [7] with a given set of
interference.
2) Find the beam pattern u¯j,k by u¯j,k = uj,k/‖uj,k‖2.
3) Substitute u¯j,k into (9b) and set (9b) as equality to
obtain (12).
4) For a given ηj, determine pj using (12).
5) Update ηj with p−j and repeat step 4 until the optimal
p∗j is obtained.
B. COORDINATED MULTICELL BEAMFORMING
Another special coalition structure is that all of the BSs form
a grand coalition and coordinately design beamformers for
their users, which is known as fully coordinated multicell
beamforming. By jointly designing beamformers for all users
in all cells, inter-cell interference can be effectively mitigated
and the transmission power of each BS can be reduced. For
this case, the multicell power minimization problem has been
formulated in [4] as follows:
minimize
U1,··· ,UJ
J∑
j=1
αˆj‖U j‖2F (14a)
subject to
|uHj,khj,j,k |2
K∑
l 6=k
|uHj,lhj,j,k |2 +
J∑
i 6=j
K∑
m=1
|uHi,mhi,j,k |2 + σ 2j,k
≥ γj,k , ∀j, k, (14b)
where αˆj is the weighting factor assigned to the jth BS in
the grand coalition . As stated in [4], the optimal solution
of (14) can be obtained by solving a dual uplink problem
for the same set of SINRs. By introducing the Lagrangian
technique, (14) can be transformed to the following uplink
problem:
minimize
λ1,1,··· ,λJ ,K
J∑
j=1
K∑
k=1
λˆj,kσ
2 (15a)
subject to
λˆj,k |uˆHj,khj,j,k |2∑
(i,m) 6=(j,k) λˆi,m|uˆHj,khj,i,m|2 + αˆjuˆHj,k uˆj,k
≥ γj,k , ∀j, k, (15b)
where λˆj,k and uˆj,k are the uplink power and receiver beam-
former of the kth user in the jth cell in the grand coalition ,
respectively. The uplink power λˆj,k can be iteratively obtained
through the method proposed in [35], and the uplink beam-
former uˆj,k can be calculated through the following equation
uˆj,k = (
J∑
i=1
K∑
m=1
λˆi,mhHj,i,mhj,i,m + αˆjI)−1hj,j,k (16)
According to [4], a downlink beamformer should be a
scaled version of the corresponding uplink beamformer
as uj,k =
√
δˆj,k uˆj,k , where the scaling factor δˆj,k can be
obtained using (18) in [4]. Based on this, the fully coor-
dinated beamforming proposed in [4] is summarized in
algorithm 2.
Algorithm 2 Fully Coordinated Beamforming
1) Iteratively find the uplink power λˆj,k .
2) Determine the receiver beamformers using (16) for a
given set of uplink power allocation.
3) Obtain the scaling factor δˆj,k using equation (18) in [4].
4) Calculate the downlink beamformers using uj,k =√
δˆj,k uˆj,k .
FIGURE 1. Multicell beamforming for a given coalition structure.
C. BEAMFORMERS DESIGN FOR A GIVEN
COALITION STRUCTURE
After considering the fully non-cooperative and fully
coordinated cases, we are interested in formulating the
multicell downlink beamforming for a given coalition
structure [36]. In the coalitional beamforming, disjoint cells
merge to several coalitions and BSs in each coalition jointly
design beamformers for their users. A typical coalitional
form beamforming is shown in Figure 1, in which cell 1
and cell 2 has formed a coalition while cell 3 and cell 4 are
singleton coalitions. The coordination exists only within each
coalition, which means that the beamformers are designed
with partial coordination and each coalition is still com-
peting with other coalitions. Hence, to find the optimal
beamformers for all users in all coalitions, the coalitional
game can be transferred to a strategic non-cooperative sub
game (SNSG), in which players are the coalitions. For a
singleton coalition, the utility function is still the transmis-
sion power while for coalitions consisting of multiple cells,
utility function is the weighted total transmission power of
BSs within each coalition. Hence, in SNSG, each coalition
competes with other coalitions by greedily maximizing its
utility.
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We consider a coalition structure S with Ns coalitions
{C1, · · · ,CNs}, where
⋃Ns
q=1 Cq = . Let s = {1, · · · ,Ns}
be the set of players for the SNSG game with coalition
structure S and coalition Cq is the qth player of the SNSG
game, ∀q ∈ s. For the SNSG game with coalition structure
S, the utility function of coalition Cq is defined as
Tq =
∑
j∈Cq
K∑
k=1
αˇj‖uj,k‖22 =
∑
j∈Cq
αˇj‖U j‖2F (17)
where αˇj is the weighting factor of the jth BS with the
coalition structure S and
∑
j∈Cq αˇj = 1. It should be noticed
that for the single coalition, αˇj = 1 and (17) reduces to (5).
Define the beamformer matrix of coalition Cq in the coali-
tion structure S as Uq〈S〉. This is the strategy for coalition
Cq. U−q〈S〉 is defined as the beamforming strategy of all
coalitions except coalitionCq. Then, by introducing downlink
SINRs, the admissible strategy set for coalition Cq is defined
as
Bq〈S〉 = {Uq ∈ CM×K |Cq| :
0j,k (Uq〈S〉,U−q〈S〉) ≥ γj,k ,∀j ∈ Cq,∀k},
(18)
where γj,k is the SINR target at the kth user in the jth cell
for all j ∈ Cq. The interference induced by all BSs outside
coalition Cq to the kth user in the jth cell can be written as∑
i/∈Cq
∑K
m=1 |uHi,mhi,j,k |2. Then, the SNSG game for a given
coalition structure S can be written as
〈s, {Bq〈S〉}q∈s , {Tq}q∈s〉 (19)
The optimal strategy of the qth coalition for this game is
obtained by solving the following optimization problem
minimize
U j,∀j∈Cq
∑
j∈Cq
αˇj‖U j‖2F (20a)
subject to
|uHj,khj,j,k |2
K∑
l 6=k
|uHj,lhj,j,k |2 +
∑
i∈Cq
i 6=j
K∑
m=1
|uHi,mhi,j,k |2 + ηˇj,k
≥ γj,k , ∀j ∈ Cq,∀k, (20b)
where ηˇj,k is the inter-coalition interference from BSs outside
coalition Cq to the kth user in the jth cell plus noise power for
all BSs j ∈ Cq. By rewriting the inter-coalition interference
in a coalitional game form, ηˇj,k is given by
ηˇj,k =
∑
x∈s
x 6=q
∑
i∈Cx
K∑
m=1
|uHi,mhi,j,k |2 + σ 2j,k (21)
For a given coalition Cq in coalition structure S with multiple
BSs and a given set of ηˇj,k , problem (20) can be solved
using themethod proposed in [4]. The optimal transmit beam-
formers can be obtained via the corresponding dual uplink
problem. Then, similar to the fully coordinated case, by
introducing the Lagrangian duality, (20) can be transformed
to the following optimization problem
maximize
λj,1,··· ,λj,K ,∀j∈Cq
∑
j∈Cq
K∑
k=1
λˇj,k ηˇj,k (22a)
subject to 6ˇj  (1+ 1
γj,k
)λˇj,khj,j,khHj,j,k (22b)
where
6ˇj =
∑
i∈Cq
K∑
m=1
λˇi,mhHj,i,mhj,i,m + αˇjI (23)
and λˇj,k is the uplink power of the kth user in the jth cell with
the coalition structure S. According to [4], problem (22) is
equivalent to the following optimization problem
minimize
λj,1,··· ,λj,K ,∀j∈Cq
∑
j∈Cq
K∑
k=1
λˇj,k ηˇj,k (24a)
subject to
λˇj,k |uˇHj,khj,j,k |2∑
i∈Cq
K∑
m=1
λˇi,m|uˇHj,khj,i,m|2 + αˇjuˇHj,k uˇj,k
≥ γj,k
1+ γj,k (24b)
where uˇj,k is the uplink beamformer for the kth user in the jth
cell with the coalition structure S. According to [4] and [15],
the optimal uplink power λˇj,k , ∀j ∈ Cq, ∀k , can be determined
through the following iterative fixed point method
λˇj,k = γj,k1+ γj,k ·
1
hHj,j,k6ˇ
−1
j hj,j,k
. (25)
Once the optimal uplink power λˇj,k is obtained, the optimal
receiver beamformer uˇj,k is the MMSE receiver, expressed as
uˇj,k = (
∑
i∈Cq
K∑
m=1
λˇi,mhHj,i,mhj,i,m + αˇjI)−1hj,j,k . (26)
The solution of uplink power λˇj,k and receive beamformer
uˇj,k depends only on the intra-coalition channels and weight-
ing factors in coalition Cq, and it is independent of the inter-
ference induced by BSs outside Cq. It has been proved in [4]
that the transmit beamformer uj,k is the scaled version of the
receiver beamformer uˇj,k . Hence, the transmit beamformer
uj,k should also be a scaled version of u˜j,k , where u˜j,k is
the beam pattern of uˇj,k for the kth user in the jth cell with
‖˜uj,k‖22 = 1 for the coalition structure S. This can be obtained
as
u˜j,k = uˇj,k‖uˇj,k‖2 . (27)
Hence, for coalition Cq in S, we can design a fixed set
of beam patterns for users inside Cq without considering
any inter-coalition interference [36]. By writing the transmit
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beamformer as uj,k = √pj,k u˜j,k , where pj,k is the downlink
power allocated to the kth user in the jth cell, the weighted
total power minimization (20) can be restated as
minimize
pj,1,··· ,pj,K ,∀j∈Cq
∑
j∈Cq
K∑
k=1
αˇjpj,k (28a)
s.t
pj,k |˜uHj,khj,j,k |2
K∑
l=1
l 6=k
pj,l |˜uHj,lhj,j,k |2 +
∑
i∈Cq
i 6=j
K∑
m=1
pi,m |˜uHi,mhi,j,k |2 + ηˇj,k
≥ γj,k , ∀j ∈ Cq,∀k. (28b)
Since all SINR constraints should achieve equality when opti-
mal beamformers u∗j,k =
√
p∗j,k u˜j,k is obtained ∀j ∈ Cq,∀k ,
constraints (28b) can be rewritten as
pj,k
|˜uHj,khj,j,k |2
γj,k
−
K∑
l=1
l 6=k
pj,l |˜uHj,lhj,j,k |2
−
∑
i∈Cq
i 6=j
K∑
m=1
pi,m |˜uHi,mhi,j,k |2 = ηˇj,k , ∀j ∈ Cq,∀k (29)
To simplify our expression, it is assumed all the BSs in
coalition Cq with ascending indexes are renumbered from 1
to |Cq|. Then, parameters can be re-denoted in the following
way: denote h(i)x ,(j,k)q ∈ CM×1 as the channel vector from the
ith BS in coalitionCx to the kth user of the jth cell in coalition
Cq and u(j,k)q as the downlink transmit beamformer vector for
the kth user in the jth cell in coalition Cq. p(j,k)q represents
the allocated power to the kth user in the jth cell in coalition
Cq. The power allocation vector of coalition Cq in coalition
structure S can be denoted as pˇq = [pT(1)q , · · · , pT(|Cq|)q ]T ,∀Cq ∈ S, where p(j)q is the power allocation vector of the
jth cell in coalition Cq. By setting all SINR constraints in
coalition Cq to equality, the following equation is obtained
Fqpˇq = ηˇq (30)
where ηˇq = [ηˇT(1)q , · · · , ηˇT(|Cq|)q ]T and ηˇ(v)q is the inter-
coalition interference vector of the vth BS in coalition Cq.
Fq is a K |Cq| × K |Cq| matrix with the following structure
Fq =

F(1,1)q F
(1,2)
q . . . F
(1,|Cq|)
q
F(2,1)q F
(2,2)
q . . . F
(2,|Cq|)
q
...
...
. . .
...
F
(|Cq|,1)
q F
(|Cq|,2)
q . . . F
(|Cq|,|Cq|)
q
 (31)
where F(j,i)q is a K ×K sub-matrix with the following entries
[F(j,i)q ]k,m =

|˜uH(j,k)qh(j)q,(j,k)q |2
γ(j,k)q
i = j, m = k,
−|˜uH(j,m)qh(j)q,(j,k)q |2 i = j, m 6= k,
−|˜uH(i,m)qh(i)q,(j,k)q |2 i 6= j
(32)
for j, i = 1, · · · , |Cq| and k,m = 1, · · · ,K . The best
response strategy of the sub-game is expressed as
pˇq = Rq( ˇp−q) = F−1q ηˇq (33)
It should be noticed that the best response strategy exists
only if Fq is invertible. By rewriting the inter-coalition inter-
ference in a matrix form, the best response strategy can be
expressed as
pˇq = F−1q (
∑
x∈s
x 6=q
Fxqpˇx + 1σ 2) (34)
where Fxq is the inter-coalition interference matrix of size
K |Cq|×K |Cx | from the xth coalition to the qth coalition with
the following structure
Fxq =

F(1,1)xq F
(1,2)
xq . . . F
(1,|Cx |)
xq
F(2,1)xq F
(2,2)
xq . . . F
(2,|Cx |)
xq
...
...
...
F
(|Cq|,1)
xq F
(|Cq|,2)
xq . . . F
(|Cq|,|Cx |)
xq
 (35)
in whichF(j,i)xq is aK×K sub-matrix with the following entries
[F(j,i)xq ]k,m = |˜uH(i,m)xh(i)x ,(j,k)q |2, j = 1, · · · , |Cq|,
i = 1, · · · , |Cx |,
k = 1, · · · ,K ,
m = 1, · · · ,K . (36)
It should be noticed that (34) is the best response obtained
based on a coalition Cq with multiple BSs in which the
downlink beam pattern u˜j,k is obtained using (26) and (27).
However, for a singleton coalition, the downlink beam pat-
tern should be determined using the method presented in
algorithm 1. Based on the discussion above, the downlink
beamforming for a given coalition structure is summarized
in algorithm 3.
Lemma 1 : For a given coalition structure S, the best
response function (34) of the qth coalition is standard.
Proof : The proof is similar to the one presented in [15],
hence not repeated here. 
According to the fixed point theorem in [35], a standard
function means that if the Nash Equilibrium (NE) of the
SNSG for a given coalition structure exists, then the NE point
is unique. The sufficient and necessary conditions for the
existence and uniqueness of the NE for the non-cooperative
game (9) has been given in [15]. In this paper, we only
consider the case that the NE for the non-cooperative game
exists. For a given coalition structure S, by rewriting the
downlink SINRs for all users in all cells into the matrix form,
the following equation can be obtained
G
′
pˇ∗ = 1σ 2 (37)
where G
′
is a matrix with the same structure of G as defined
in (13). The difference between G
′
and G is that they are
obtained through different sets of beam patterns.
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Definition 1 (M-Matrix) [37], [38]: A square matrix A is
said to be an M matrix if Ay ≥ 0 implies y ≥ 0 for all y.
A squarematrixA is a Z -matrix if all its off-diagonal elements
are nonpositive.
To distinguish with the normal matrix inequality, we write
A ≥ B if ai,j ≥ bi,j, ∀i, j,
A > B if A ≥ B and A 6= B,
whereA andB are matrices with the same dimension; ai,j and
bi,j are the (i, j)th elements of matrices A and B, respectively.
Then, the following proposition holds:
Proposition 1: If the NE of the non-cooperative game (9)
exists, the NE of the SNSG game for a given coalition struc-
ture S, S 6=  exists if there exists an inverse-positive matrix
A1, satisfying A1 ≤ G′ .
Proof: First, since matrix G
′
is a square matrix with the
same structure as G, the matrix G
′
is a Z -matrix. As proved
in [15], if the NE of the non-cooperative game (9) exists, G is
an M -matrix.
Let A2 be a Z -matrix satisfying A2 ≥ G and A2 ≥ G′ .
SinceG is anM -matrix,G−1 exists andG−1 > 0. In addition,
since A2 is a Z -matrix satisfying A2 ≥ G, according to [37],
the inverse matrix A−12 exists and G
−1 ≥ A−12 ≥ 0. Hence,
A2 is an inverse-positive matrix.
If there exists an inverse-positive matrix A1 satisfying
A1 ≤ G′ , then both A1 and A2 are inverse-positive and
according to [38], they are also monotone. Since A1 ≤ G′ ≤
A2, then G
′
is also monotone [36, Corollary 3.5], which
meansG
′−1 exists andG′−1 > 0. Hence, equation (37) can be
written as pˇ∗ = G′−11σ 2 > 0, which means that there exists
positive solutions pˇ∗ for (37). Thus, theNE of the SNSGgame
exists.
Algorithm 3 Coalitional Beamforming Algorithm
1) Find the downlink beam pattern u˜j,k via Algorithm 1
and Algorithm 2 for singleton coalitions and coalitions
with multiple BSs respectively.
2) Substitute u˜j,k into (28b) to obtain equation (33).
3) For a given ηˇq, determine pˇq using (33).
4) Update ηˇq and repeat step 3 until the optimal pˇ
∗
q is
obtained.
5) Calculate the optimal downlink beamformer using
u∗j,k =
√
p∗j,k u˜j,k .
If coalition structure S is a partition with all singleton
coalitions, algorithm 3 will reduce to algorithm 1; while
if S is the grand coalition , algorithm 3 is equivalent to
algorithm 2. For a given coalition structure, the best response
strategy of the above SNSG game is obtained based on fixed
sets of weighting factors for all coalitions in S with multiple
BSs. This means that the change of weighting factors in a
coalition will change the NE, which will be discussed in
section IV.
IV. COALITION FORMATION PROCESS
In this section, we focus on the coalition formation process.
First, some definitions are given. The concept of q-Deviation
has been proposed in [18] as a deviation rule that describes
how a coalition structure transits to another coalition struc-
ture in the coalitional formation process. Here, we apply
such concept to our problem and introduce the concept of
α-Deviation.
Definition 2 (α-Deviation): Sn
α,2−→Sn+1 represents the pro-
cess of transiting the coalition structure Sn to the coalition
structure Sn+1 by merging coalitions in 2 to a new coalition
CM = ⋃2 with a given α, where 2 ⊂ Sn; CM ∈
Sn+1 and Sn+1 = Sn\2 ∪ CM ; α are the weighting factors
in vector form for all BSs in CM with α ∈ R|CM |+ and
‖α‖1 = 1.
With the above definition, a coalition structure Sn can
transit to coalition structure Sn+1 by merging all coalitions in
the set 2 into one coalition. However, the new coalition CM
can be successfully formed only if BSs j ∈⋃2 agree to such
transition on the basis of a given decision rule. Several deci-
sion rules have been studied in [30] for both individual utility
comparison and collective utility comparison. In our coalition
formation problem, the individual utility based decision rule
is applied by comparing utilities achieved in Sn+1 and Sn
for all BS j ∈ ⋃2. Both Pareto Order and Majority Order
comparisons have been proposed in [30]. We apply both
of these comparison rules to the coalition formation
process.
As discussed in previous sections, in the existing works of
multicell beamforming, beamformers for users of different
BSs are coordinately designed without considering the cost
of cooperation. However, in practice, such cooperation cost
cannot be ignored. Hence, in our coalitional beamforming
problem, we include the cost of cooperation for the formation
of coalition. The cooperation cost of a BS is assumed to be
linearly proportional to the size of the coalition it is attached
to, i.e. the cooperation cost for the BS j in the coalition
structure S is
j(S) = (|C| − 1), j ∈ C (39)
where  is the cost factor. For BSs that do not cooperate with
other BSs, |C| = 1, hence zero cost.
In the coalitional beamforming, each BS intends to reduce
its transmission power by cooperating with other BSs; hence,
once a new coalition CM is formed, the benefit for the BSs
in CM is the reduced transmission power. However, in prac-
tice, it cannot be guaranteed that all BSs will benefit from
the deviation, especially when the cooperation cost is taken
into consideration. Hence, the concept of deviation gain
is introduced as the total benefit obtained through the
deviation Sn
α,2−→Sn+1 by each BS. We first define the
resource consumption of the jth BS in the coalition structure
Sn as
rj(Sn) = pj(Sn)+ j(Sn), ∀j. (40)
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Then, the deviation gain of BS j obtained by Sn
α,2−→Sn+1 can
be defined as
νj(Sn
α,2−→Sn+1) = rj(Sn)− rj(Sn+1), ∀j. (41)
In addition, for deviation Sn
α,2−→Sn+1, it is assumed only BSs
in
⋃
2 can decide whether to form coalition CM and the
rest of the BSs are not allowed to make decisions. Based on
these definitions and rules, both strongly independent com-
parison and weakly independent comparison can be stated as
follows:
Strong Independence Comparison: Pareto Order
Sn+1 P Sn iif
νj(Sn
α,2−→Sn+1) ≥ 0, ∀j ∈
⋃
2, and
∃j ∈
⋃
2 satisfy νj(Sn
α,2−→Sn+1) > 0. (42)
In Pareto order comparison, Sn can transit to Sn+1 only if the
deviation gains of all BSs in
⋃
2 are nonnegative and at least
one BS j ∈ ⋃2 has positive deviation gain. Those BSs in⋃
2 that have obtained negative deviation gains will decline
to stay in the coalition CM and the coalition structure Sn+1
can not be achieved.
Weak Independence Comparison: Majority Order
Sn+1 M Sn iif
|{j|νj(Sn α,2−→Sn+1) > 0, ∀j ∈
⋃
2}| >
|{j|νj(Sn α,2−→Sn+1) < 0, ∀j ∈
⋃
2}|. (43)
Different to the Pareto order comparison, in majority order,
if the majority of BSs in
⋃
2 have positive deviation gains
of Sn
α,2−→Sn+1, Sn is allowed to transit to Sn+1. Hence, in
this way of comparison, no BS can unilaterally reject a
coalition formation. In the following, we use  = {P
,M } as the comparison strategy set that includes both
of these comparison rules. Hence, it can be concluded
that Sn
α,2−→Sn+1 is reachable if and only if Sn+1  Sn
holds.
A. COALITION FORMATION ALGORITHM
Based on the discussion above, a coalition structure can be
reached through a coalition formation process on the basis
of α-Deviation. In this section, an algorithm for the coalition
formation game is developed. As discussed in section III,
for a given coalition structure, the beamformer design is an
SNSG game, which means that for the deviation Sn
α,2−→Sn+1,
BSs in
⋃
2 can only decide whether to stay in the newly
formed coalition CM after the coalition structure Sn+1 is
formed and the Nash equilibrium of the SNSG game with
Sn+1 is achieved. Hence, in our algorithm, a merge-regret
formation strategy is adopted. The coalition formation is
shown in Algorithm 4.
We assume the coalition formation process always starts
from the non-cooperative game in which all coalitions are
singletons. Each BS has a preset index and knows the indexes
Algorithm 4 Merge-Regret Based Coalition Formation
Algorithm
1) Input: , b, 
2) Initialize: n = 0, Sn, l = min{b, |Sn|}
3) while l ≥ 2
4) Each coalition generates b∗ l-combinations of Sn in
lexicographical order;
5) Initialize: k = 1
6) Sn temporarily transits to St by merging coalitions
in the kth combination 2k into a single temporary
coalition Ct ;
7) Compute utility tj(St ) for all BSs j ∈ Ct with α
= 1|Ct |1 using Algorithm 3;
8) Each BS j ∈ Ct computes νj(Snα,2k−→St ) using (40)
and (41);
9) if St  Sn holds
10) n = n+ 1;
11) Update Sn = St and l = min{b, |Sn|};
12) Number all coalitions in Sn;
13) Go to step 4;
14) elseif k < b∗
15) BSs in Ct split from Ct and re-form Sn;
16) k = k + 1;
17) Go to step 6;
18) else
19) BSs in Ct split from Ct and re-form Sn;
20) l = l − 1;
21) Go to step 4;
22) Output: Sn, α
of other BSs. It is assumed that BSs can communicate with
each other and share coalition information without addi-
tional cost. For a coalition structure Sn, all coalitions are
numbered in a specific way. Each coalition in Sn first gen-
erates a set of l-combinations with lexicographical order,
where l = min{b, |SN |} and b is the maximum allowable
size for merging [18]. Then, by using the same sequence of
l-combinations, coalitions in the first l-combination merge
into a temporary coalition Ct with a given α = 1|Ct |1, and the
coalition structure Sn is temporarily transited to St . Then, BSs
in Ct will decide whether Ct is valid. Based on algorithm 3,
each BS in Ct will determine the best response beamforming
strategy at the NE; then its transition gain can be calculated
and sent to all other BSs in Ct . A decision can be made
by all BSs in Ct . If St  Sn holds, Ct is valid and Sn+1 =
St ; else, BSs in Ct will split from the temporary coalition
Ct and the original coalitions Sn will be reformed. Then,
another temporary coalition with the next l-combination will
be formed. The above process is repeated until a valid coali-
tion structure is found. If for all l-combinations, no valid
coalition structure Sn+1 is found; this means l is too large
for coalitions in Sn to transit to a new coalition structure
via α-Deviation. Then each coalition will generate a new set
of l-combinations with lexicographical order by reducing l
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to l − 1 and repeating the process of temporary coalition
formation until l < 2. If no valid coalition structure St
is found, algorithm stops and coalition structure Sn will be
sustained; else, Sn is successfully transited to Sn+1 and the
coalition formation is continued.
In practice, the coalition formation process highly depends
on the message exchange between BSs. In a coalition with
multiple BSs, BSs cooperate with each other to design beam-
formers. In this process, the channel state information of users
in the coalition needs to be exchanged through the backhaul
network of all BSs in the coalition. In addition, once a coali-
tion structure is reached, the newly formed coalitions need
to be numbered for further merging process. Such number-
ing process requires BSs in different coalitions to exchange
the information of members in each coalition. It should be
noticed that for the beamformer design in a coalition, the
channel state information of users needs to be constantly
updated by each BS; hence, this process will cause an evident
increase of power consumption. However, for the numbering
process, the number of data bits passing through the backhaul
network is very small, hence the overhead caused by such
message exchange can be ignored.
B. α-MODIFICATION ALGORITHM
As discussed in section III, in coalitional beamforming, beam
patterns for users in a coalition depend only on the intra-
coalition channels of the coalition and the weighting factors
assigned to all BSs within the coalition. This means that by
modifying weighting factors, beam patterns of all users in
the coalition will be reshaped and the transmission power of
each BS will be changed. In Algorithm 4, once a temporary
coalition Ct is formed with a given α = 1|Ct |1, the coalition
structure Sn is temporarily transited to St . If St  Sn holds,
the formation of Ct is valid, then Sn will formally transit
to Sn+1, where Sn+1 = St ; else Ct will be split and the
next temporary coalition will be formed. However, once a
temporary coalition Ct is found invalid, by modifying the
weighting factor vector α, both the Nash equilibrium point
of the SNSG game and the transmission power of BSs in Ct
can be changed, which might lead St  Sn to hold and Ct to
be valid.
The effect of this modification process can be seen in
Figure 2, in which a network with two cells and two users
in each cell is considered. As seen in Figure 2, if both the
BSs individually design beamformers for their users in a
competitive way, the Nash eqiulibrium can be obtained with
transmission power of 0.45W and 0.8W for BS1 and BS2
respectively. When the two BSs coordinately design beam-
formers with α = [0.4 0.6], the consumed power of BS 2 is
reduced to 0.57W; however, the power consumed by BS1 is
increased to 0.46W. This means that if the Pareto comparison
is applied, even if the coordination cost is not taken into
consideration, the two BSs will still decide not to join in
a coalition. However, once α is modified to [0.9 0.1], the
power consumption of both the BSs has been reduced as com-
pared to the competitive design. This will lead to a positive
FIGURE 2. Power consumption of individual BSs for different
beamforming design methods.
decision for the coalition formation. Hence, for the proposed
Algorithm 4, by employing the α-Modification scheme,
there is a better chance to successfully deviate to a new
coalition structure. To formulate the α-Modification algo-
rithm, we first define the deviation gain ratio of α-Deviation
as
βj = νj(Sn
α,2−→Sn+1)
rj(Sn)
, ∀j. (44)
Then, if St Sn does not hold, α can be modified through the
following equations:
αj = αj + ζ, ∀j ∈ 1, for Pareto order;
∀j ∈ 3, for Majority order, (45)
αj = αj − ζ, ∀j ∈ 2, for Pareto order;
∀i ∈ 4, for Majority order, (46)
where ζ is the step size for updating.
For Pareto comparison, 1 = {j|νj(Sn α,2−→St ) < 0,∀j ∈
Ct } is the set of BSs with βj < 0 while 2 ⊂ Ct is a set of
|1| BSs with |1| largest β values. It is obvious that α can
be modified only if 1 satisfies |1| < |{j|νj(Sn α,2−→St ) > 0,
∀j ∈ Ct }|. However, in practice, with a very large |1|,
even if the above condition is satisfied, it will be still dif-
ficult to achieve St P Sn with the modified α due to
the limitation of flexibility for those BSs in 2. Hence, an
upper bound µ is introduced so that the Pareto comparison
based α-Modification is applicable only if |1| ≤ µ <
|{j|νj(Sn α,2−→St ) > 0,∀j ∈ Ct }|.
Different to the Pareto case, for majority comparison, αj
of BSs in 3 and 4 will be modified, where 3 is the
set of Nm BSs with smallest |βj| values and βj < 0; while
4 ⊂ Ct is a set of |2| BSs with largest β values. Nm is the
minimum number of BSs that need to improve βj values and
is obtained as
Nm = dNd + 12 e,
9260 VOLUME 5, 2017
Y. Wu et al.: Coalitional Games for Downlink Multicell Beamforming
where d·e is the ceiling function defined as dxe = min{y ∈
Z | x ≤ y} and
Nd = |{j|νj(Sn α,2−→St ) < 0,∀j ∈ Ct }|
− |{j|νj(Sn α,2−→St ) > 0,∀j ∈ Ct }|. (47)
Similar to the Pareto case, the upper bound µ has been intro-
duced so that the majority comparison based α-Modification
is applicable only if Nm ≤ µ < |{j|νj(Sn α,2−→St ) >
0,∀j ∈ Ct }|. Then, by introducing the maximum number
of modifications NM and integrating the Pareto case and the
majority case, the α-Modification algorithm is summarized
in Algorithm 5.
Algorithm 5 α-Modification Algorithm
1) Input: St , Ct , ζ , µ, NM , {rj(Sn),∀j ∈ Ct }
2) Initialize α(m) = 1|Ct |1, m = 0
3) Compute utility t (m)j (St ) for all j ∈ Ct with α(m)
using Algorithm 3;
4) Each BS j ∈ Ct computes ν(m)j (Sn
α,2−→St ) and β(m)j
using (40), (41), (44) and rj(Sn);
5) if St  Sn holds
6) n = n+ 1;
7) Sn = St ;
8) Go to step 17;
9) elseif |1| > µ (or |3| > µ)
10) Go to step 17;
11) elseif m < NM
12) Update α(m) using (45) and (46);
13) m = m + 1;
14) Go to Step 3;
15) else
16) Go to step 17;
17) Output: Sn, α(m)
C. STABLE COALITION STRUCTURES
In the coalition formation game, a main concern is that
whether the output coalition structure is stable. To analyze the
stability of the coalition structures obtained by the proposed
algorithm, the following definition is given.
Definition 3 : Sn+1 α-b dominates Sn, if there exists a
combination 2 ⊂ Sn, |2| ≤ b, with a given α ∈ R|
⋃
2|
+
such that Sn
α,2−→Sn+1, and Sn+1Sn. The α-b dominance can
be written as Sn+1 α−b Sn.
On the basis of the above definitions, the solution of the
coalition formation game can be obtained by introducing the
concept of Coalition Structure Stable Set proposed in [31].
By defining the coalition formation game proposed in Algo-
rithm 4 as (P,), the Coalition Structure Stable Set can be
defined as follows:
Definition 4 (Coalition Structure Stable Set): The set of
coalition structures R ⊂ P is a coalition structure stable set
of (P,) only if the following conditions are satisfied [31]:
TABLE 1. Some possible coalition strutures for a multicell network with
seven cells.
* R is internally stable for (P,) if there does not
exist S,
S ′ ∈ R such that S α−b S ′ ;
* R is externally stable for (P,) if for all S ∈ P/R,
there exists S ′ ∈ R such that S ′ α−b S;
* R is a coalition structure stable set for (P,) if it is
both internally and externally stable.
For the proposed coalition formation algorithm with a
certain comparison rule (Pareto or majority), it is a sequential
process in which coalitions can only merge into a larger size
coalition. Such characteristic could guarantee the formation
process always reach some stable points. This can be directly
proved by considering an output coalition structure So of
Algorithm 4. We first assume So is in the coalition structure
stable setR and a coalition structure S ′o can be found inR that
has S
′
o α−b So; this means that So can further transit to S ′o
via Algorithm 4 and So is not the output of (P,), which
contradicts to the assumption. In addition, we can assume
that So is outside the coalition structure stable set R that
So ∈ P/R. Then, according to external stability, there should
be a coalition structure S
′
o in R that satisfies S
′
o α−b So,
which also contradicts to the assumption. Hence, the output
coalition structures from Algorithm 4 must be in the coalition
structure stable set.
Proposition 2 : The coalition formation game (P,) can
reach a unique coalition structure, if and only if the following
conditions are satisfied:
• A numbering strategy is adopted to all coalition
formations;
• If the α is allowed to be modified, a given α-
Modification algorithm must be applied to all of the
coalition formations;
Proof: This is a direct consequence from
Definition 1 and Algorithm 4. If the α-Modification
algorithm is not employed, if there is a fixed num-
bering strategy only, the sequence of the coalition for-
mation process is unique and the unique output is
guaranteed.
Once the α-Modification algorithm is employed, if for dif-
ferent coalition formation processes, different modification
schemes are allowed, the sequence of the coalition formation
process may be altered. Hence, to guarantee the uniqueness
of the output, it is necessary to ensure that the same α-
Modification algorithm is employed to all of the coalition
formations.
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TABLE 2. Probability of performance improvement for different coalition transit process and target SINRs.
V. NUMERICAL RESULTS
Some numerical results for the proposed coalition formation
algorithms are presented. We consider a multicell network
with seven cells each serving two users. It is assumed that
each BS employs six antennas while each user is equipped
with a single antenna. To simplify the simulation setting, the
target SINRs for all users in all of the cells are set to an
identical value. The noise variance σ 2 at the receiver of all
users is set to 0.01W. The channel coefficients have been gen-
erated using zero mean complex Gaussian random variables.
A distance dependent path loss model with path loss exponent
of 3 is introduced to calculate channel gains for both inter-
cell and intra-cell channels. The distance between a BS and
its users is set to 0.9 kilometers for all BSs while the distance
between any two neighboring BSs is set to six kilometers.
It is assumed that the coalition formation game always starts
from a non-cooperative game setting. Once a new coali-
tion structure is reached, a postpositional numbering strat-
egy is used so that the newly formed coalition is always
numbered as the last coalition while all other coalitions
are numbered in the ordinary way. We assume that the
cooperation cost is characterized by the same dimension as
power hence the cooperation cost factor  has a unit of
Watt [36].
Before demonstrating the benefits of the proposed for-
mation algorithm, we wish to consider the cases as
in Table 1 to showmerger of coalitions can potentially reduce
the transmission power most of the times. As an example, as
seen in Table 1, for the coalition structure transit S1→ S2, the
coalition {7} is forced to merge with the coalition {1, 2}. Out
of 10000 various channel realizations, we observed 98.21%
of the time, this random merge has reduced the total power
consumption of all seven BSs as shown in Table 2. The
table also indicated the percentage of power reduction for
a different transit S4 → S5. This shows the advantage of
merging coalitions even in an arbitrary manner. However,
the deterministic approach as proposed in this paper provides
even better performance.
Figure 3 compares the performance of the proposed coali-
tion formation algorithm with that of the fully competitive
beamforming discussed in [15] and the fully coordinated
beamformer design algorithm developed in [4]. In this case,
target SINRs of all users are set to 18.5dB while the coop-
eration cost factor  is set to 0.005W. We observed that the
fully coordinated design has the advantage of reducing the
power consumption for individual BSs most of the time. For
both the Pareto comparison and the majority comparison, the
proposed algorithm resulted into lower power consumption
FIGURE 3. Transmission power and resource consumption of individual
BSs for various beamforming design methods.
FIGURE 4. Effect of α-Modification algorithm on the number of coalitions.
for the individual BSs as compared to a fully competitive
design. However, when the cooperation cost is included, BSs
may not always benefit from cooperation. Hence, as shown
in Figure 3, the proposed algorithm has a better performance
in terms of resource consumption than the fully competitive
design and fully coordinated design most of the time. Hence,
when the cooperation cost is included, the proposed algorithm
improves the performance of the network.
We then investigated the effect of α-Modification algo-
rithm on the proposed coalition formation algorithm. As seen
in Figure 4, α-Modification is very sensitive to the Pareto
comparison, however for most of the cases, α-Modification
does not change the number coalitions significantly for
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FIGURE 5. Effect of α-Modification algorithm on the total transmission
power.
FIGURE 6. Total resource consumption versus various SINR targets.
majority comparison mode. Lower number of coalitions is
likely to provide higher saving in the transmission power.
Therefore, we notice that the majority comparison per-
forms better than the Pareto comparison for most of the
SINR targets. The effect of these four schemes on the total
resource consumption is shown in Figure 5. As seen, all
four schemes consume almost the same amount of resources,
however, a closer look reveals that the majority comparison
based algorithm provides more saving in terms of resource
consumption.
Figure 6 compares the total resource consumption of the
output obtained with different b values. As seen, both cases of
b = 2 and b = 4 have resulted almost identical total resource
consumption. Hence, the value of b has limited effect on the
performance of the coalition formation process in terms of
resource consumption. However, in practice, in addition to
resource consumption, other factors such as the formation
speed should be considered. Figure 7 shows the performance
in terms of the number of temporary coalitions formed, for
different b values. Larger the number of temporary coalitions
more the time it takes for final coalition formation. As the
SINR target increases, the number of temporary coalitions
decreases and converges to almost the same value for both
b = 2 and b = 4. However, when the target SINR is small,
FIGURE 7. Number of temporary formations versus various SINR targets.
FIGURE 8. Number of temporary formations versus various cooperation
cost factors.
the number of temporary coalitions is considerably low for
b = 2. Hence, it is a good practice to choose a lower b value.
So far, we have analyzed the key parameters of the pro-
posed algorithm and their effect on the coalition formation
process. However, all of these simulations are based on the
assumption that the cooperation cost factor is set to 0.005W.
Now, we investigate the effect of the cooperation cost on the
coalition formation process. As seen in Figure 8, once again
a lower b value provides a better performance almost for all
values of the cooperation cost.
VI. CONCLUSION
We have proposed a multicell multiuser downlink beamform-
ing technique using coalitional games. Due to the benefits
of coordination, every BS has incentive to cooperate with
other BSs via forming coalitions. However, when the asso-
ciated cost is included, cooperation may not be preferred
by all the BSs since any benefits in terms of reduction of
transmission power may be overwhelmed by the cost of
cooperation. We first considered the beamformer design for a
given coalition structure and illustrated the process of finding
downlink beamformers for all users. Then, we studied the
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coalition formation game and proposed a merge-regret based
sequential coalition formation algorithm. We have shown
that the output of the proposed algorithm is in a coalition
structure stable set. With certain constraints, the proposed
algorithm can produce a unique stable coalition structure.
The simulation results have shown that the majority mode
can always provide a better performance. Generally, it is
better to choose a smaller b value to accelerate the coali-
tion formation process. As part of the proposed coalition
formation algorithm, the α-Modification algorithm has been
developed for a range of comparison rules. The simulation
results demonstrated that when the Pareto mode is used, the
employment of α-Modification algorithm can help to reduce
the number of coalitions at the output, and decrease the total
power consumption.
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